Navy Report: San Francisco Crew Was Weak In Navigation
Shortcomings Are Seen As Key Factor In Sub's Undersea Crash

By ROBERT A. HAMILTON
Day Staff Writer, Navy/Defense/Electric Boat
Published on 4/22/2005

A preliminary report on the submarine that hit a seamount in the Pacific three months ago concludes that numerous warnings of shortcomings in the ship's navigation department existed at least a year before the accident.

In a January 2004 inspection, the USS San Francisco crew did not properly use its fathometer warning system and its electronic Voyage Management System, or VMS, which were both factors in the accident a year later, according to the report, a copy of which was provided to The Day.

In August 2004, during another inspection, the San Francisco navigation team was found deficient in the chart review process, and in a certification process in October 2004, the team failed to adequately highlight hazards to navigation on the charts, the report found.

The report outlines a series of weaknesses in the navigation process –– starting before the San Francisco left port –– that led to the Jan. 8 grounding that killed one crewman and injured almost everyone on board, 29 of them seriously enough to require hospital care.

“The navigation and command teams on SFO (San Francisco) failed to develop and execute an effective voyage plan that would ensure the safe and prudent navigation of the ship,” says the Mishap Investigation Report, as it is known. “This was the fundamental cause of the grounding.”

The report paints a grim picture of the first minutes after the accident, when the engineer did not recognize the ship had lost almost all its speed — the speed indicator was stuck on 25 knots as a result of the crash — and did not take steps to compensate for the reduced maneuverability of a submarine at slow speeds.

“This could have had drastic consequences,” the report says. “Although this lack of action in maneuvering did not contribute to the grounding, it could have resulted in the loss of the ship and crew had the forward main ballast tanks not held enough air to provide upward momentum.”

Within six seconds of the crash, however, the crew had the submarine in an “emergency blow,” rising quickly to the surface, but with the bow down as much as 14 degrees as it climbed 525 feet in less than 90 seconds.

The report provides considerable insight into the damage aboard the ship, and estimates it will cost $88 million to repair, though it cautions, “an engineering assessment is in progress that could substantially change this estimate.”

The report notes that all four torpedo tube doors were deformed and inoperable; that 15 torpedoes and two Tomahawk missiles had to be repaired, that the sonar dome was smashed and mostly missing and that the sonar sphere was breeched, along with three main ballast tanks.

It also lists page after page of other damage, such as computers, lockers, lights and other equipment that was smashed by men flying through the air.

The report praised the ship for doing an exceptional job at making sure equipment was stowed properly before the accidents so loose gear was not turned into missiles, and for a response to both the mechanical and medical problems that was very effective.

•••

The report found fault with Submarine Squadron 15 in Guam, where the San Francisco is based, and with Submarine Group Seven in Yokosuka, Japan, which oversees Squadron 15.

There has been considerable griping within the submarine community that that the San Francisco crew has shouldered all the blame while higher-ups have escaped criticism.

Although the report placed the blame for the accident squarely on the navigation team and command team on the San Francisco, it found that the squadron and the group could have done more to prepare the ship for sea.

In particular, the report noted that the squadron “did not take adequate action to correct previously identified deficiencies in open ocean navigation onboard SFO,” and did not even require the ship to report what it was doing to fix the problems.

In addition, the squadron did not provide adequate oversight of the San Francisco's navigation performance because it was understaffed, with two positions unfilled, and the squadron assistant navigator was assigned to one of the other squadron submarines for most of the previous year.

The report also notes the document known as a “Subnote” from the Group, which laid out a path and average speed, was delivered to the ship two-and-a-half days before San Francisco sailed, and the Group's own requirements are that it be to the ship three to five days before sailing.

But the report found the submarine captain spent as much time as he usually did reviewing the charts, as did other members of the navigation team, and that the timing of the Subnote did not contribute to the accident.

“Although the ship felt that the late delivery of the Subnote did not affect the method in which the voyage was planned, reviewed and approved, that is only because their process lacked the rigor to ensure such adequate voyage planning was accomplished,” the report concludes.

Capt. Matthew S. Brown, a spokesman for Adm. Walter F. Doran, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said the Mishap Investigation Report is an internal document, intended as a quick review of an accident.

“I'm not going to discuss the contents of a report that is not releasable,” Brown said. He said the final command investigation will be out soon, perhaps within another week or two, “that will go into much greater detail.”

•••

San Francisco left Guam just before 8 a.m. Jan. 7, headed for a liberty port call in Brisbane, Australia, according to the report, prepared by a team led by Capt. Kenneth D. Walker, commander of the Pacific Naval Submarine Training Center, in the weeks immediately after the accident.

At 1:53 a.m. the morning of Jan. 8, the navigation team shifted to chart E2203, which generally showed water depths of 7,200 to 7,800 feet along its intended path. But less than five hours later, the ship's fathometer recorded a depth of 5,610 feet.

From 6 to 7 a.m., the soundings were all about 1,200 feet shallower than what was shown on the charts. At 7:30 a.m., the ship went to periscope depth to use the global positioning system to fix its position on the charts accurately, and submerged again at 9:48 a.m.

At 11 a.m. the fathometer reported 8,652 feet of water; at 11:15, 5,988 feet; at 11:30, just under 6,588 feet.

At 11:43:21 a.m., the San Francisco ran into an underwater mountain at a speed greater than 25 knots, just as the crew was finishing lunch.

Machinist Mate 2nd Class Joseph Allen Ashley was killed as he was thrown into a large piece of equipment in the machinery spaces. Dozens of others were seriously wounded, and “nearly all of the 138 crew members suffered some sort of injury,” according to the report.

The investigation team faulted the San Francisco for not recognizing the shoaling water and for not becoming more cautious when the depths that were showing up on the fathometer did not match what was on the chart.

And it said the submarine should probably have been doing more than one sounding every 15 minutes — and certainly should have done one when the submarine changed its depth from 400 to 525 feet at 11:39.

“Had they taken a sounding at this point (four minutes prior to the grounding) it is likely that the sounding would have indicated a depth significantly shallower than charted water depth,” the report found.

A more serious problem emerged from a review of the use of charts on the San Francisco, the investigation found.

“All members of the (San Francisco's) navigation team believed that the E2202 chart was the best information available and that it was based on extensive U.S. Navy surveys,” the report found. “This assumption was invalid.”

In fact, the investigation team said, there was a notation that some of the features on the chart might be off by as much as three nautical miles, and the submarine had at least three other charts on board of the same area that showed an area of “muddy water” that was an indication of a seamount.

“The only chart on which this report does not appear is E2202, the chart in use at the time of the grounding,” the report says.

The investigation also found that the navigation team did not understand the nature of the hazards in the Caroline Island chain, where the accident occurred. Generally ships are told to use caution within 12 nautical miles of land; the San Francisco team was under the impression that two miles was sufficient.

•••

San Franciscohad one of the most advanced navigation tools available today in the submarine force, the VMS. Though the system was not certified as a primary navigation tool, the ship could have programmed its Subnote into the system.

“Had this been done, the ship would have received a warning, alerting them to the presence of a navigational hazard along the ship's track,” the report says.

It found that the failure to use VMS was “the result of a lack of training, lack of adequate procedures and lack of supervision by both the internal and external chains of command.”

The report found that the Subnote did route the San Francisco through the area where it hit the seamount, and it recommends that in the future the group take more care to route submarines around known navigational hazards. It also said the Subnote “specifically states that navigational safety is not provided by the Subnote and rests with the ship.”

“Each member (of the navigation team) had an initial reaction of unease when viewing the charted transit through the Caroline Islands,” the report says. “However, each member convinced himself, without careful assessment of risk and evaluation of possible offsets, that the transit could be made safely as laid out on their chart.”

“After failing to conduct a proper assessment, the ship was left with a ‘business as usual' attitude exemplified by the CO's comment that he was operating on a 40 (nautical mile)-wide highway,” it continues.

The investigation also rejected the notion that the average speed laid out in the Subnote was too high, even though it was higher than the average in the last 30 Subnotes issued by Group Seven. In fact, at the time of the grounding, San Francisco was almost 40 miles ahead of where it had to be, and was going faster than required for operational considerations.

Navy Faults Navigational Procedures In Crash Of Sub

By ROBERT A. HAMILTON
Day Staff Writer, Navy/Defense/Electric Boat
Published on 4/9/2005

A Navy report on the submarine that hit a sea mount in the Pacific three months ago will conclude that there was a serious breakdown in navigation procedures that led to the accident, which killed one sailor and injured more than half the crew, Navy sources have told The Day.

The report, which could be released as early as this month, will cite problems with the USS San Francisco's chart preparation methods and, more seriously, the crew's failures to recognize specific warnings that the submarine was headed into trouble.

Soundings showed the bottom was more than 1,200 feet shallower than on the charts that were in use, a difference of more than 20 percent, the sources said. In addition, the ship's fathometer showed the water was shoaling, or getting more shallow with each reading, over an extended period of time, the sources said.

Either one of the warnings should have prompted the crew to slow the submarine down and proceed far more cautiously, the sources said. Instead, the ship plowed into an underwater mountain that was nearly a sheer cliff at a speed of about 30 mph.

In addition, the navigation team was not laying out the ship's projected track far enough ahead of the ship's actual position to determine whether it was sailing into safe water, a particularly dangerous practice in the island-studded area of the Pacific where the San Francisco was operating, the sources said.

One of the sources said he was on a submarine that nearly ran into another uncharted sea mount, but the navigation team recognized and responded to the early warnings and avoided grounding.

•••The San Francisco left its homeport of Guam on Friday, Jan. 7, headed for Brisbane, Australia. The next day, a little more than 400 miles southeast of Guam, as sailors were sitting down to lunch, it slammed into the sea mount in an area where official Navy charts list 6,000 feet of water.

Three of the four ballast tanks in the bow were shattered, the sonar dome and sonar sphere were smashed, and a bulkhead at the front end of the ship was buckled. But the crew got the ship to the surface and rigged it to make the trip back to Guam.

Machinist Mate 3rd Class Joseph Ashley was killed when he struck his head on a large pump. Almost two dozen others were injured so badly they could not perform their duties, though within days most were treated and released from a hospital in Guam. Most of the crew were treated for some injury.

At an admiral's mast in February, the captain was found guilty of putting the ship into danger and was relieved of command. Last month, six more crewmen were cited for putting the ship into danger or dereliction of duty, and received punishments that included demotions and letters of reprimand.

Almost immediately, attention focused on the fact that the mountain was not on the charts, and even some within the submarine community wondered whether the crew should be held responsible.

But the investigation showed that there were at least five notices to mariners, most recently in 2002, about a large patch of muddy water about three miles south of the sea mount that were not incorporated on the charts the San Francisco was using at the time, the sources said.

If the bottom had been as deep as the 1989 chart indicated, that muddy patch would not have appeared.

Certainly, incorporating notices to mariners on existing charts is arduous. On Feb. 5, for instance, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which produces map information for the military, issued a notice to mariners about the sea mount that the San Francisco hit.

That notice is 58 pages long and covers hundreds of changes worldwide, including four — the sea mount, an obstruction and two depth changes — on the specific chart, number 81023, the San Francisco was using when it ran aground. And it is one of 15 notices issued so far this year.

But submariners said no matter how cumbersome, a failure to adequately update the charts with the notices can put the ship in danger, as the San Francisco incident proved.

•••

The Navy has been criticized for not issuing updated charts if it knew of a possible hazard to submarine operations in the area. But updates are expensive and take time. The agency that would make the changes has been kept busy in recent years on other work, such as terrain mapping in Afghanistan and Iraq, where accurate maps are critical to land operations and cruise-missile strikes, the sources said.

There were other problems with the navigation practices on the San Francisco that might not have contributed to the accident, but which indicated a slackness that is unacceptable in the submarine force, the sources said.

The San Francisco was using a chart that showed the area in a large scale, which was convenient for the high-speed transit it was making but did not provide sufficient detail about other dangers in the area, the sources said.

And the submarine crew had not adequately projected the ship's intended track on its charts. One of the sources said it would not have been uncommon to have had the entire track to Brisbane laid out on the charts, and to brief the navigation team daily on the track for the next 24 hours, but the San Francisco had not met either of those standards.

Under submarine-force regulations, the navigation team might prepare the charts, but the captain, executive officer, navigation officer, assistant navigation officer, and senior electronics technician responsible for navigation would have had to review the voyage planning process, and signed the charts as acceptable.

Navy sources said putting your signature on that chart makes you personally liable for its accuracy, a responsibility that naval officers cannot take lightly.

In the crew's defense, it has been noted that the operational orders known as the Subnote, which was issued by Submarine Group 7 in Yokosuka, Japan, arrived at the ship only a short time before it was to leave.

The Subnote provides the submarine with several points where it must be and the time it must be at those points, provides an average speed of the transit and the submarine track. It also provides the submarine with a “moving haven,” an area where no friendly submarines will be operating and where the Navy will not be using subsurface hazards to navigation such as towed sonar arrays.

Having the Subnote get to the ship so late provided the ship little time to prepare, and the Subnote routed the ship through the area of the sea mount.

But that defense was dismissed at the non-judicial proceedings known as the captain's mast where the navigation team was punished, for several reasons, including the fact that if the submarine had insufficient time to prepare adequately, the captain should have asked for more time. And while the track is laid out in the Subnote, the crew must still follow safe navigation practices — if the Subnote called for it to transit an area of heavy boat traffic, for instance, the crew is expected to avoid hitting other craft, one of the sources pointed out.

The captain and navigation team were also held liable because San Francisco was making flank speed, or just about top speed for the submarine, through an area that it should have known was dangerous.

•••Even more serious than them breakdown in the chart preparation process, the sources said, were the warning signs that were not heeded, particularly the soundings taken by the ship's fathometer. Just minutes before the crash, the San Francisco came to the surface to check its location on the Global Positioning System.

The submarine is also equipped with the sophisticated Ring Laser Gyro Navigator, so it knew its position with a high degree of certainty.

Yet where the charts showed 1,000 fathoms of water, the sounding showed less than 800 fathoms — still a huge safety margin below the keel, but a difference that should have caused the navigation team to recommend proceeding with caution.

In addition, the navigation team had noted for a lengthy period that the water depth was shoaling, or becoming more shallow.

The team apparently believed it was a faulty reading — moving through the water at 30 mph, fathometer readings can be inaccurate — and the team kept hoping that perhaps the next reading would correlate with the chart.

In retrospect, it's clear that the readings were accurate, the water was shoaling, and the San Francisco was heading for what was nearly an underwater cliff.

February 12, 2005

US Submarine Captain Relieved of Command

The US Navy relieved from command the captain of a US nuclear-powered submarine that rammed into an undersea mountain in the Pacific last month, killing one crew member and injuring 98 others.

Commander Kevin Mooney was removed for failing to follow crucial navigational procedures before the USS San Francisco crashed into the mountain, and he also received a letter of reprimand following a hearing in Yokosuka, Japan, the navy said.

In announcing the decision by Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, commander of the Seventh Fleet, the navy said investigators had found that "several critical navigational and voyage planning procedures were not being implemented" aboard the submarine.

The Navy added that "by not ensuring these standard procedures were followed," Mooney put the vessel in jeopardy.

Late last month, Mooney had been reassigned pending the outcome of an investigation into the incident.

The Los Angeles-class attack submarine slammed head-on into what military officials have said was an uncharted undersea mountain some 560 kilometers (350 miles) south of Guam on January 8, partly flooding the sonar dome in the vessel's bow.

Machinist Mate Second Class John Allen Ashley, 24, of Akron, Ohio, died two days later of injuries suffered in the grounding.

Twenty-three other crew members were initially believed to have been injured, but the Navy has since revised that figure upward to 98, including 23 who were seriously injured.

US media reported Saturday that the vessel was traveling close to top speed some 150 meters (500 feet) below the surface when it crashed. The sonar, which is used to scan for underwater obstacles is usually unreliable at high speeds.

Although the underwater mountain the San Francisco hit was no shown on Navy charts, CBS News reported that other charts available to the captain warned that satellites had detected a discolored area of water, which could indicate an obstacle beneath the surface.

In addition, prior to the crash, the crew took depth soundings, which revealed the water was shallower than shown on the chart.

The damaged submarine limped into port in Guam on January 10. Mooney had earlier been reassigned to Submarine Squadron 15, based in Guam. Commander Andrew Hale, the squadron's deputy commander, has since assumed the role of commanding officer of the USS San Francisco.

A vessel's commander is typically held responsible for mishaps of this nature, but officials had suggested that Mooney might escape blame if the investigation found that the mountain was not on the charts and the skipper had exercised sound judgment.

February 12, 2005 - DOOW Account

To say that I've had a bad year so far would be a little short on the truth I think. Last year was a good one for the boat. After spending 5 months away from home in drydock (Sandy Eggo) we got our second BA on ORSE (bad juju), received the highest score in PacFlt for a submarine TRE inspection, aced our mine readiness inspection with 4 out of 4 hits, completed 2 outstanding missions (will have to shoot you), and completed a early ORSE just before Christmas with an EXCELLENT.

It was also the first year that Auxiliary Division had a Christmas standown since coming out of the yards in 2002. A-division also took the CSS-15 Red DC award for the second year in a row. My retention has been 100% since I checked onboard in Oct 2002 amongst 1st/2nd and turd termers.

We were going to our first true liberty port 2 weeks ago, heading for Brisbane and fun in the sun. As this WOG knows, we were getting ready for our crossing the line ceremony and the crew was really upbeat, and hard charging, we had just completed a great year for the San Fran.

To say the world went to shyte in a hand basket would be an understatement.

I would put it closer to a nightmare that becomes reality.

The seamount that is a large part of the discussion the last 2 weeks is un-named. The charts we carried onboard were up to date as far as we cantell. No modern geographic data for this area was available to us onboard as it is a remote area not often traveled by the Navy. We have one of the BEST ANav's in the fleet onboard, a true quartergasket that takes pride in his job. We have RLGN's onboard, when they are running, they are accurate as hell for our position, they also drive Tomahawks.
We knew where we were. All of my depth gauges and digital read the same depths as we changed depth to our SOE depth for flank. I can't discuss alot, because I'm still a participent of at least 2 investigations....LOL.

I was the Diving Officer of the Watch when we grounded. If you read the emails from ComSubPac, you will get some of the details, from flank speed to less than 4 knots in less than 4 seconds. We have it recorded on the RLGN's-those cranky bastages actually stayed up and recorded everything.

For you guys that don't understand that, take a Winnebego full of people milling around and eating, slam it into a concrete wall at about 40mph, and then try to drive the damn thing home and pick up the pieces of the passengers.

As for the actual grounding, I can tell you that it was fortunate that myself and the Chief of the Watch were blessed by somebody. I was standing up, changing the expected soundings for a new depth on the chart (yes, we had just moved into deeper water) leaning against the ship's control panel with a hand grip, and the COW was leaning down to call the COB on the MJ.
The next thing to cross my mind was why am I pushing myself off of the SCP and where the hell the air rupture in the control room come from? I didn't know it, but I did a greater than 3g spiderman against the panel, punched a palm through the only plexiglass gauge on the SCP and had my leg crushed by the DOOW chair that I had just unbuckled from. The DOOW chair was broken loose by the QMOW flying more than 15 feet into it and smashing my leg against a hydraulic valve and the SCP. I don't remember freeing myself from it. If I had been buckled in, I don't think I would be writing this.

The COW was slammed against the base of the Ballast Control Panel, and only injured his right arm. He could of destroyed the BCP, he was a big boy.

Everybody else in control, with the exception of the helm, was severely thrown to the deck or other items that were in their way, and at least partially dazed.

Within about 5 seconds of the deceleration! , we blew to the surface, it took that 5 seconds for the COW to climb up the BCP and actuate the EMBT blow.

We prepared to surface right away and got the blower running asap, I didn't know how much damage we had forward but knew it was not good, I wanted that blower running.

I would say that about 80% of the crew was injured in some way, but do not know the number. We grounded in the middle of a meal hour, just after field day, so most of the crew was up. Once we got the boat on the surface and semi-stable with the blower running the rest of the ship conditions started sinking in to our minds.

We were receiving 4MC's for injured men all over the boat. I was worried that those reports were over whelming any equipment/boat casualties that could make our life worse. I had teams form up of able bodied men to inspect all of the forward elliptical bulkhead, lower level, and tanks below those spaces. I couldn't believe that we did not have flooding, it just didn't fit in. At one pointI looked around in the control room, and saw the disaster. The entire control room deck was covered in paper from destroyed binders, and blood. It looked like a slaughterhouse, we had to clean it up.

I knew that Ash was severly injured and brought to the messdecks, he was one of my best men, and one of our best sailors onboard, he was like a son to me. After surfacing I was the control room supervisor, I had a boat to keep on the surface and fight and knew that if I went below to see how he was doing, it would teeter me on the brink of something that the ship did not need, the ship needed somebody who knew her. I have to say that the design engineers at Electric Boat, NavSea and others have designed a submarine that can withstand incredible amounts of damage and survive. We lost no systems, equipment, or anything broke loose during the impact. The damage to our sailors was almost all from them impacting into the equipment.

The crew is a testament to training and watch team backup. When a casualty occurs, you fight like you train, and train like you fight. It kept us alive during that 2+day period.

I've just returned from the honor of escorting my sailor home to his family. God bless them, they are truly good people and patriotic. The Navy is doing everything they can for them and they are learning how submariner's take care of each other. During the memorial and viewing on Saturday, CSS-15 provided a video from the coast guard of us on the surface and the SEAL/Dr.
medical team being helo'd in, the family had this video played on 2 screens in thebackground. It was a sobering reminder of what a hard woman the ocean can be. We had to call off the helo because of the sea state, it was becoming too dangerous for the aircraft, we almost hit it with the sail a couple of times.

The sea would not allow us to medivac in our condition and that sea state.

I was one of the 23 sent to the hospital that Monday. I was fortunate, my leg was not broken, just trashed/bruised. I walked on that leg for almost 24 hours before it gave out on ! me and they had it splinted. The SEAL made me promise not to walk on it, how do you refuse a SEAL? LOL. So I hopped around on a single leg for awhile, the other chief's were calling me Tiny Tim, LOL. "God bless each and every one! Except you, and you, that guy behind you!". The COB threatened to beat my @ss if I walk onboard before my leg is otay, he's about the only man onboard that I'd take that from, hehe.

The crew is doing better, we've lost a few due to the shock of the incident.

We will make sure they are taken care of. The investigation goes on, and I have a new CO. I will only say that the San Fran was the best damn sub in the Navy under CDR Mooneys leadership. We proved that. God bless him and his family no matter what happens in the future, he is truly a good man.

I just need to get my leg healed and get back to fighting my favorite steel bitch.

February 4, 2005

Thanks again to Phil Polefrone, here are some more pictures of the San Francisco in drydock. It is absolutely amazing that this boat survived. As Jerry Moore said the other day in a short email he sent to me; "These were well built boats, he just didn't know they were that well built!". Click the thumbnail image to blow it up into a larger size.

January 28, 2005

I received the following information from Phil Polefrone who was on the John Marshall in the mid-1970s and later served as CO of another 688 boat. He sent me this information before the San Francisco was put into the floating drydock. I found his information very interesting and thought others might like it also.

I was CO of SSN 723 from 91-94.  Here are some thoughts about SF:

SF is one of the first flight 688s, commissioned in 1984, without bow planes, without vertical launch tomahawks  [missiles] in the forward main ballast tanks, with a thicker pressure hull, and with considerably lower horsepower than the newest flight of 688s (711 was designed with the original propulsion plant, pre-Chicago).  Had the ship been one of the newest 688s, I fear the ship's recovery would have been different, certainly it would have been more challenging for the crew.  The newest 688s have more power so more damage at flank would have been sustained.  Newer 688s hull was shaved by 5/8 inch for ballast / ship recover considerations, their forward control surfaces are not on the sail  [vertical part of boat] , controls are in the fwd MBTs  [main ballast tanks] , and most important, the forward MBTs have a dozen TLAM  [tomahawk missiles] fueled and loaded missiles with all the missile external hydraulic systems and umbilicals there -- more penetrations into the forward eliptical bulkhead, etc. in addition to the PBX explosive.   

The photos show the extent of damage to the bow, showing that the dome was shredded and that the sonar sphere was apparently imploded.  (The dome probably sustained much of the visible damage during the trip back to Guam.) 

The cofferdam seems to indicate that they plan to repair her.  (This is the standard 688 zipper cofferdam, into the sonar equipment space CSES.  Unfortunately I lived with that hole for a few months.)  Standard practice is to cut that hole before drydocking, although the cofferdam could be just there to prevent flooding if the buoyancy bags failed -- I don't know if there is still a  drydock in Guam?  The port side of the MBTs appear to be caved in severely, in the photo that shows the sonar dome bolting ring.

The pictures shown in the following table are the official U.S. Navy Photos associated with the USS San Francisco.

Click on the thumbnail to blow up each individual picture. When fully opened, the pictures measure approximately 18 inches wide by 13 inches tall. Did I tell you al that these pictures are huge? You will definitely have to use your scroll bars.

I had a funny thought on the way to work this morning. I wonder if the USS Portsmouth (SSN 707) is going to be an organ donor to the San Francisco. Since they're identical class and flight of 688 and the Portsmouth was just recently decommissioned it seems that it would be a perfect blood type match.

	050109-N-0000X-001 Pacific Ocean (Jan. 9, 2005) – An MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter, assigned to the “Providers” of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Five (HC-5), transfers medical personnel to USS San Francisco (SSN 711) located south of Guam, following an underwater collision, Jan. 8. Medical personnel were rushed to the Los Angeles attack submarine once it was within range to assist the ship’s independent duty Corpsman in providing urgent treatment to injured crew members. Regrettably, Machinist Mate 2nd Class Allen Ashley died soon after the medical team’s arrival from massive head injuries. U.S. Navy photo (RELEASED)
	050126-N-4658L-056 Apra Harbor, Guam (Jan. 26, 2005) - The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS San Francisco (SSN 711) is escorted into dry dock by tugs Taga, Golith and Magsino in Apra Harbor Guam. The Navy former dry dock known as “Big Blue” is capable of docking ships that weigh up to 40,000 Long Tons. The Navy certified Big Blue for the one-time docking of San Francisco so that officials can assess the damage to the submarine following an incident in which it ran aground approximately 350 miles south of the U.S. territory on Jan. 8, 2005. San Francisco is the second fast-attack submarine to be attached to the forward-deployed Submarine Squadron Fifteen, home ported on board Naval Base Guam. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Mark Allen Leonesio (RELEASED)
	050127-N-4658L-030 Apra Harbor, Guam (Jan. 27, 2005) - The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS San Francisco (SSN 711) in dry dock to assess damage sustained after running aground approximately 350 miles south of Guam Jan. 8, 2005. The Navy former dry dock known as “Big Blue” is capable of docking ships that weigh up to 40,000 Long Tons. The Navy certified Big Blue for the one-time docking of San Francisco. San Francisco is the second fast-attack submarine to be attached to the forward-deployed Submarine Squadron Fifteen, home ported on board Naval Base Guam. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Mark Allen Leonesio (RELEASED)

January 26, 2005

The San Francisco in drydock. i bet a lot of "Hail Mary's" were said when the drydock drained and the true extent of the damage could be seen. Click the thumbnail to enlarge the picture.

January 25, 2005

                Click photo to enlarge.

January 20, 2005

New London -- The galley crew had started to serve lunch as the USS San Francisco checked its position against a global positioning system satellite, checked the water depth with its fathometer, and announced that the ship was going to dive, all routine operations aboard an attack submarine.

Four minutes after it submerged, that routine was shattered one week ago today as the San Francisco crashed into an undersea mountain at more than 35 mph, sending sailors crashing into equipment and bulkheads and destroying the bow dome and three of the main ballast tanks at the front of the sub.

The accident released kinetic, or non-radioactive, energy on the scale of the electrical output of the Millstone 2 nuclear reactor, which explains the extensive damage to the ship and the severity of the injuries — one man was killed and more than 60 others were injured, two dozen of them seriously.

But engineers are impressed that despite the violence of the underwater encounter, the ship's reactor, steam turbine generators, electrical distribution network and even its navigation system were unharmed, and the ship was able to limp back to port on its own.

Through dozens of interviews with submariners, active duty and retired, as well as a review of a variety of internal Navy documents, an account of the accident that nearly crippled the San Francisco is beginning to emerge. Because the investigation is still under way, there are few official sources of information, however.

The captain of the San Francisco, Cmdr. Kevin Mooney, has not been relieved of duty, perhaps the most telling evidence that the initial inquiry has found that the sub was following all the correct procedures and had the misfortune to run into an uncharted seamount.

In fact, Rear Adm. Paul Sullivan, commander of the Pacific submarine force, said in an unclassified e-mail obtained by The Day that he was impressed with how the captain and crew dealt with the aftermath of the crash.

“The continuous operation of the propulsion plant, electrical systems and navigation demonstrates the reliability of our equipment and the operational readiness of our crews as a whole,” Sullivan wrote.

“The impressive Joint and Navy team effort which resulted in SFO (San Francisco) returning to port safely says volumes about the ingenuity and resourcefulness of all our armed services. For all who participated in this effort, thank you and your people. We are all eternally grateful to each of you.”

The San Francisco was built at what is now the Northrop Grumman Newport News (Va.) Shipyard, was commissioned in 1981, and was originally homeported at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. After a refueling overhaul completed in 2002, it was assigned to the new submarine base in Guam.

The San Francisco had finished all the post-refueling sea trials and conducted its first two-month deployment last year, arriving back in Guam Dec. 1, 2004. On Friday, Jan. 7, it set sail for Brisbane, Australia, for a port visit. The sailors were probably excited — Australians still recall that the U.S. submarine force kept the Japanese at bay in the Pacific during World War II and generally treat American submariners well.

Saturday morning, soon after breakfast ended at 6 a.m., the ship conducted a “field day,” during which the entire ship is cleaned, top to bottom. All 137 men on board would have been out of their bunks and taking part until just before lunch was served at 11 a.m. They would have removed deck plates to clean bilges and other hard-to-reach spaces.

The chief petty officers on board warned everyone as they finished to “stow for sea” — make sure everything is bolted down or locked up. In the event of a collision, loose objects tend to become unguided missiles. As a result, the ship was probably more tightly stowed than usual, which helped prevent more serious injuries, submariners said.

In late morning, the ship was at periscope depth, checking to make sure it was on course. Everything checked out; the ship was just over 400 miles southeast of Guam, near the Caroline Islands ridge, but the charts showed that there was no water less than about 6,000 feet deep for at least seven miles around the boat, more than enough of a safety margin for submariners, who are known to be cautious.

Some time about 11:30, after running through a safety checklist to make sure the boat was ready to submerge, the officer of the deck gave the order to dive. The San Francisco used the dive to pick up speed, and was soon running at flank speed, something in excess of 30 knots.

Although its destination was to the southwest, it was headed in an easterly direction, probably because it had “cleared its baffles,” or changed direction to check to make sure there were no submarines trailing it in the spot directly behind the ship, where its normal sonar sensors cannot “hear.”

At 11:42 a.m. Guam time, about four minutes after diving, the San Francisco crashed head-on into a nearly vertical wall of stone, a seamount that was not on the charts. In an instant, the submarine's speed dropped from almost 33 knots horizontal to 4 knots almost straight up as the bow whipped up and the ship tried to go over the obstacle — without success.

Crewmen told family and friends that the moment was surreal, so unexpected that it took a moment to realize what had happened: The sub had rammed into something and was out of control. One sailor told a friend it reminded him of the movie “The Matrix,” in which everything slows down and a disaster unfolds in slow motion.

The diving officer of the watch, normally strapped into a chair in the control room, had just unbuckled his belt to update a status board. He struck the control panel so hard that he broke some of the gauges. Some crewmen were tossed 20 feet into bulkheads, several narrowly missing being dropped down through stairways.

A couple of men were smoking in the lower level of the engine room, and more were waiting their turn — it is the only area in the sub where smoking is allowed. The area includes much sharp-edged metal equipment that caused several of the lacerations and broken bones that had to be treated later.

Machinist Mate 2nd Class Joseph Allen Ashley, 24, of Akron, Ohio, who had just re-enlisted for a second four-year term, was in the main seawater bay at the back of the sub. He was thrown forward 20 feet into the propulsion lube oil bay, striking his forehead against a large metal pump. He was knocked out and died the next day without regaining consciousness.

Through the chaos, though, the crew followed the procedures they had drilled on day after day as submariners. Within seconds, one of the crewmen at the helm, his arm broken in the crash, pulled the “chicken switch,” which forces high-pressure air into the main ballast tanks to force the submarine to the surface.

The executive officer suffered a serious back injury when he was thrown onto an emergency air supply pipe, but he was quickly directing damage-control efforts. Injured men were carried to the crew's mess and the wardroom, where the tables were pressed into service as gurneys. The ship's “doc,” an independent duty corpsman trained in emergency medicine, began assessing and treating the injuries.

One of the ship's junior officers was a former enlisted man and was able to help out. Other crewmen were recruited to keep men with head injuries awake until they could be checked out, as the worst cuts were stitched and the worst breaks were set.

When a medical team arrived from Guam via helicopter the next morning, a surgeon, an undersea medical officer and another independent duty corpsmen remarked that the care given to the injured crewmen was outstanding, particularly considering the circumstances.

The submarine force has a policy of “water space management” that would have required Mooney, the skipper, to file a plan showing his expected track and speed through the area to make sure he would not be in the same water as another submarine at the same time. Navy sources said there was nothing on that plan that would have raised any alarm.

In addition, given the charts that showed only deep water in the area, Mooney would not have been expected to do depth soundings more than every 30 minutes, certainly no more than every 15 minutes, which would not have given him enough time to react to the steep seamount. In fact, he might not have been able to avoid grounding even with nearly continuous soundings.

The undersea mountain was so steep that there was damage visible even on the top of the sonar dome, which indicates that the sub hit a virtual wall.

The San Francisco would have picked up the mountain if it was using active sonar, but submariners use that sparingly because it gives the boat's location away. Instead, it would have been using passive sonar — listening for the noises made by other ships and submarines. But seamounts don't make any noise, and even if there were currents swirling around it, the noise would have been lost in the noise the San Francisco was making as it sped through the water near top speed.

Jeff Schweitzer, a research professor in the Physics Department at the University of Connecticut, said the submarine's kinetic energy at 33 knots and 4 knots is easy to calculate — one-half its mass (6.3 million kilograms) times its velocity (16.98 meters per second before the accident, 2.06 meters per second afterward), or 902.4 megajoules before, and 13.3 megajoules afterward. So the accident released just over 889 megajoules of energy.

The Millstone 2 reactor in Waterford is rated at 870 megawatts, so if the ship slowed over a second, it released roughly the same energy in that time as Millstone 2 could generate.

“It would have lit quite a few light bulbs,” Schweitzer said. “It is a lot of energy, which is why the collision cracked rock and dented such strong steel.”

He said it would take much more complex calculations to determine where all that energy went — how much went into bending the steel of the ballast tanks, or even heating the water in the area around the wreck — but the release was enormous.

Physics also explains the injuries, a fundamental principal being that a body in motion tends to stay in motion until something slows it down, whether air friction or a steel bulkhead. If the submarine instantly decelerated from 33 knots to 4 knots, in theory the men aboard would have kept moving forward at 29 knots relative to the rest of the ship until they encountered something hard.

Schweitzer noted, however, that even sitting in a chair or standing on the floor would bleed off part of that speed, and that the ship would have decelerated over a second or so, which would also yield a slight difference.

“So it might not be the same thing as being thrown forward at 29 knots,” Schweitzer said. “But it would have been a lot more comfortable to have been in a seat and belted in.”

At the time, however, no one on the San Francisco was doing the calculations. They were more worried about saving the ship. At almost 550 feet, the water pressure would have been almost 240 pounds per square inch, so even a small leak could have quickly put the ship in danger.

In addition, it quickly became apparent that three of the four forward ballast tanks had uncontrollable leaks, which caused the ship to take on a serious bow-down aspect. That was dangerous for two reasons: any forward movement could quickly drive the ship deeper; and any angle would allow more air to seep out of the ballast tanks, making the ship heavier, increasing the angle even more.

Through the quick use of variable ballast tanks located throughout the ship, the crew was able to get it to the surface, though the back end of the ship was riding about four feet higher than normal, and the bow was so deep the depth markings were out of sight.

The reactor plant, propulsion system and electric distribution gear were all operating normally, however, which allowed the crew to focus on the ballast system.

Immediately, Mooney dispatched a message to Guam, where the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas dispatched the 110-foot, Guam-based Coast Guard cutter Galveston Island and the 906-foot Maritime Sealift Command cargo ship Gy. Sgt. Fred Stockham to intercept the submarine and escort it home, but it would be almost a day before they arrived.

By 4 p.m. Saturday, the commodore of Submarine Squadron 15 on Guam had called together family members to deliver the news and promise regular briefings on the situation.

The front of the ship was so badly deformed, its maneuverability was compromised. In addition, because the bow-down aspect of the sub would force it under at even moderate speeds, the San Francisco was limited to about eight knots on the surface.

Then, poor weather on Sunday forced the captain to bring all his crewmen down from the bridge out of fear that any additional water coming down the hatch would cut further into the sub's limited buoyancy. He had to run the ship from the control room, using radar and radio to make sure it stayed close to the escort ships, but not too close.

The crew continuously operated the low-pressure blower to keep air in the ballast tanks, despite the leaks. The air pump is rated for only intermittent use, but held out for more than 30 hours during the trip back. In addition, the crew quickly implemented an emergency technique to use the exhaust from its massive auxiliary diesel engines to augment the low-pressure blower.

Back in Guam, the Navy was assembling flotation aids and welding gear to do emergency repairs when the San Francisco finally pulled into port. Divers and technical experts were on hand to assess the damage. A team was on its way within hours from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, including a structural engineer, a ballast tank expert and an air systems expert, led by Capt. Charles Doty, who commanded the USS Cheyenne in the Pacific until last year. During his time at the helm, the Cheyenne was the first ship to launch missiles in the Iraq war in 2003.

On Monday afternoon, family members lined Sierra Pier at the Guam submarine base, where they waited anxiously for their first sight of the submarine they were assured would be berthed at the pier before long. About 3 p.m., it came into view, nose down, listing visibly to starboard, with a tumultuous bow wake testifying to the damage at the front of the boat.

Submariners from the USS City of Corpus Christi and USS Houston, and the tender USS Frank Cable, which comprise the rest of Squadron 15, waited on the pier as well, ready to help tie up the ship, shut down the nuclear plant, hook up the shore power supply and otherwise aid a crew that had been up for two days straight saving the San Francisco. 

January 12, 2005 - First Hand Account and First Photos from Guam

To All,

Followup

At 10 January 1634 local (100134 EST) the USS SAN FRANCISCO returned safely to Apra Harbor, Guam. The ship moored with her own line handlers in a normal submarine configured mooring (AFT draft is 27'-10'' (normal AFT draft is 32') and FWD Draft is above the draft marks with the waterline at the point the towed array faring begins; 0.8 degree STBD list and 1 degree Down bubble indicating by naval architecture calculations that 1 A/B and 2A/B MBTs are most likely flooded). The severely injured Machinist Mate (Engineroom Upper Level Watch at time of grounding) was evacuated immediately and transferred by ambulance to Naval Hospital Guam where a fully staffed medical team was standing by. He is conscious and in stable condition. Approximately fifteen additional injured personnel requiring medical care subsequently departed the ship and were transported to the hospital after taking a moment to meet with family members.

Crew members from the USS CORPUS CHRISTI, HOUSTON and FRANK CABLE assisted in line handling and various return to port evolutions such as propulsion plant shutdown, shore power cables, and rig for surface. Standing by on the pier was a full complement of watchstanders from USS CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI (and SAN FRANCISCO stay-behinds) to satisfy all watchstanding requirements for reactor plant shutdown with follow-on import forward and aft watch sections.

Following the grounding on 8 January, the ship transited on the surface at 8kts with surface escort, USCGC GALVESTON ISLAND to Apra Harbor, Guam. Due to deteriorated weather conditions on the evening of 9 January, the Commanding Officer shifted bridge watch stations to control and shut bridge access hatches to maximize watertight integrity in light of reserve buoyancy concerns. The ship maintained stability throughout the surface transit with continuous operation of the Low Pressure Blower on the Forward Main Ballast Tanks. SAN FRANCISCO has experienced no reactor plant, propulsion train or electrical system degradations as a result of the grounding. The Commanding Officer shifted the Officer of the Deck's watch to the bridge on 10 January in preparation for piloting into Apra Harbor.

The critically injured Machinist Mate (Auxiliaryman) passed away yesterday afternoon as a result of his injuries. The MM2 was in Aft Main Seawater Bay at the time of the grounding and his body was thrown forward approximately 20 feet into Propulsion Lube Oil Bay. He suffered a severe blow to his forehead and never regained consciousness.

Emergency medical personnel, including a Naval Hospital Guam surgeon, Undersea Medical Officer and Independent Duty Corpsmen, arrived on the ship via helicopter transfer to provide immediate medical care and prepare the crewmember for medical evacuation on the morning of 9 January.

Unfortunately, the sailor's condition deteriorated and he died onboard while under the care of the embarked physicians. Just moments prior to the sailors death, I spoke with the Sailor's father in preparation for their pending travel from Ohio to the West Pacific to see their Son. Since then I have passed on to his Dad my condolences on their son's death and reassured them their son's remains would be treated with utmost respect and dignity.

His father expressed great gratitude for the extraordinary efforts made by the Navy to save his son's life. He told me his son loved the Navy, having just reenlisting earlier this year and wanted to make it a career. That when he called home he always talked about the many friendships and the wonderful camaraderie the crew of SFO exhibited. Prior to sailing, he was really excited about the pending ship visit to Australia. The parents are considering traveling to Guam, with Navy support, at some point to meet the crew and partake in a memorial service for his son.

For the remainder of the transit, the embarked medical trauma team administered medical care to the other injured personnel. Their careful attention and evaluation augments the ship's Independent Duty Corpsman's heroic efforts since the grounding.

Submarine Squadron Fifteen COMMODORE, Captain Brad Gerhke and Captain Paul Bushong, Commanding Officer of the Submarine Tender USS FRANK CABLE have mobilized their assets, staffs, crews and local Navy Community to provide comprehensive support to the SAN FRANCISCO. Professional counselors, medical personnel and Navy Chaplains are scheduled to meet with the entire crew to provide grief counseling and assistance throughout the next several days and as required over the long term. Brad has been meeting frequently with the SFO families and they are doing remarkable well. The entire Navy community in Guam has come to the SFO's families' assistance. I have talked to Kevin Mooney's (SFO Skipper) wife, Ariel. Her state of mind is positive and resolute, with a courageous and upbeat view of the trying days ahead.

The ship's Main Ballast Tank damage and deformation has degraded maneuverability and mandated the use of two tugs to moor in Apra Harbor. A Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard/NAVSEA Material Assessment Team comprised of a structural engineer, MBT vent expert, air systems expert and naval architect arrived in Guam with special ship salvage and recovery equipment to stabilize the ship pierside as soon as possible. The team, led by Captain Charles Doty, commenced a seaworthiness and repair assessment upon the ship's arrival. Once additional buoyancy measures are in place and tested satisfactory, the Low Pressure Blower will be secured to allow divers to enter the water to conduct an inspection.

While this grounding is a tragedy, with a through investigation led by Cecil Haney, we will find out all the facts and then ensure we learn from the mistakes. But, I too believe we have much to be thankful for today, and much to be confident in. An operational warship has returned to port on her own power with all but one of its crew after sustaining major hull damage.

The survival of the ship after such an incredibly hard grounding (nearly instantaneous deceleration from Flank Speed to 4 KTS) is a credit to the ship design engineers and our day-to-day engineering and watchstanding practices. The continuous operation of the propulsion plant, electrical systems and navigation demonstrates the reliability of our equipment and the operational readiness of our crews as a whole. The impressive Joint and Navy team effort which resulted in SFO returning to port safely says volumes about the ingenuity and resourcefulness of all our armed services. For all who participated in this effort, thank you and your people. We are all eternally grateful to each of you.

**END OF REPORT**

HONOLULU - A nuclear submarine ran aground about 350 miles south of Guam, injuring several sailors, one of them critically, the Navy said.

There were no reports of damage to the USS San Francisco’s reactor plant, which was operating normally, the Navy said.

Jon Yoshishige, a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor, said the Friday afternoon incident is under investigation and the 360-foot submarine was headed back to its home port in Guam.

Details on the sailors’ injuries were not immediately available. The sub has a crew of 137, officials said.

Military and Coast Guard aircraft from Guam were en route to monitor the submarine and assist if needed, the Navy said.

Guam is a U.S. territory about 3,700 miles southwest of Hawaii.

HONOLULU, Jan. 9 — A sailor injured aboard a nuclear submarine that ran aground about 350 miles south of Guam died Sunday, the Navy said. Twenty-three other crew members were being treated for injuries.

The USS San Francisco was headed back to its home port in Guam after sustaining severe damage on Saturday. The incident was under investigation, said Jon Yoshishige, a spokesman for the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor.

The name of the sailor who died was being withheld pending a mandatory 24-hour waiting period, the Navy said. The sailor's next of kin had been notified.

Lt. j.g. Adam Clampitt of the Pacific Fleet offered condolences early Sunday, saying ''anytime we lose a shipmate, it's a loss to the Navy.''

Officials said there was no information on what the submarine struck, but Clampitt said the submarine had been conducting submerged operations, and that it was headed to Australia for a port visit.

More Information from VOA - 1/10/2005

HEADLINE: US Nuclear Submarine Involved in Mid-Pacific Accident

INTRO: An accident has occurred on one of the U.S. Navy's nuclear powered attack submarines in the Pacific Ocean. The Navy says the sub, for reasons not yet known, hit bottom in one of the deepest parts of the Pacific. VOA's Steve Herman reports from Tokyo.

TEXT: The U.S. Navy says the USS San Francisco was on its way to a port visit in Australia when the accident happened in the Pacific Ocean, about 560 kilometers south of Guam.

Petty Officer Alyssa Batarla, a spokeswoman for the Navy's Pacific Fleet in Honolulu, says the nuclear-powered submarine appeared to have hit the ocean floor in the middle of the East Marianas Basin, causing injuries to some of the 137 crew members.

"There is one critical injury and number of minor injuries. Approximately 20 personnel (were) injured to the point that they are unable to stand watch. The submarine is currently on the surface and making its best speed back toward its home port in Guam."

The Navy says the submarine's hull is intact and the vessel's nuclear reactor has not been damaged.

Military aircraft, a naval submarine tender and a Coast Guard cutter have been dispatched from Guam to escort the crippled submarine back to its home port.

Officials say an attempt will be made to airlift the critically injured sailor from the submarine.

The San Francisco, commissioned in 1981, is a fast-attack submarine which is capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. It is also designed to seek and destroy enemy submarines and surface ships.

Masako Watanabe/Pacific Daily News/mwatanabe@guampdn.com Somber homecoming: Crewmembers of the USS Houston stand on deck and render honors as the USS San Francisco returns to its home port, assisted by a tug boat, at Apra Harbor on Guam yesterday afternoon. Petty Officer 2nd Class Joseph Allen Ashley, 24, died as a result of injuries sustained when the nuclear-powered submarine USS San Francisco ran aground Saturday. It was a somber moment yesterday, when hundreds of sailors stood on the decks of submarines and ships, and flags were flown at half-staff, as the USS San Francisco slowly made its way into Apra Harbor carrying the body of a 24-year-old sailor. Petty Officer 2nd Class Joseph Allen Ashley, of Akron, Ohio, died as a result of injuries sustained when the nuclear-powered submarine ran aground around noon Saturday while traveling about 350 miles south of Guam. A Navy official said yesterday the submarine struck something topographical underwater. Ashley, who was a machinist mate, suffered "significant trauma to the head" while he was working in one of the ship's engineering spaces, said Lt. Cmdr. Jeff Davis, spokesman for the U.S. Navy Pacific Submarine Force. He was initially in critical condition, but died Sunday afternoon. Ashley's family members have been notified of his death, but they are off island, Davis said. About 23 out of the submarine's 137-member crew who were on board at the time of the accident suffered a range of injuries, including broken bones, lacerations and a back injury. Their injuries were serious enough that they could not stand watch, Davis said. On top of the nearly two dozen sailors, many others suffered minor injuries including scratches and bruises, he said. "The first thing we have to do is get the injured persons off and get them to the hospital, where they can get appropriate medical treatment," Davis said. The USS San Francisco, one of the three nuclear-powered submarines based on Guam, was on its way to Brisbane, Australia, for a routine port visit when the submarine ran aground. Just before 3 p.m. yesterday, the submarine made its way -- using its own power -- into Apra Harbor and was moored at Sierra Pier, where dozens of family members of crewmembers waited. "This is something we are deeply saddened by. A loss of one of our shipmates, one of our fellow submariners, is a tragedy," Davis said. Davis said the submarine struck "something topographical" underwater and said the Navy has absolutely no reason to believe that it struck another submarine or vessel. 'Damage in the bow' "We know that there is damage in the bow, but we are not going to be able to evaluate that damage completely until that submarine is at pier side," Davis said. When asked how could a high-tech submarine hit something underwater, Davis said, "I wouldn't want to speculate on the cause. We are going to have a complete investigation. We are going to look at this very, very carefully, make sure that we have all the answers, and try to prevent anything like this from happening again." No action has been taken against any crewmembers, pending an investigation. An investigating officer will likely be appointed to look into the cause of the accident, Davis said. One of the things they will look into is whether the San Francisco or any other submarine has taken that route before. He said the Navy could not release what speed the submarine was going or what depth it was in during the accident. "There will be classified and unclassified components of it. Things like depth, we guard pretty closely," Davis said. He also could not speculate on how long the investigation will take. "This is something that submariners, all over the world, not just our Navy, but a lot of the foreign navies we work with, are grieving over," Davis said. 'Grieving process' The Navy has chaplains and counselors that the submarine's crew have a chance to meet with to help "with this grieving process," Davis said. "Any time you have a tragedy of this nature about a submarine, we want to do everything we can to take care of our Navy family aboard," Davis said. On Sunday, medical personnel were flown by helicopter to the submarine, Davis said, adding that submarines don't usually have doctors on board. "Submarines have an independent duty corpsman who can do a lot of the things doctors can do, very similar to an emergency medical technician, not actually a doctor. In this case, urgent medical attention was needed, so a doctor was put aboard the ship," Davis said.